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Prosecuting Terrorism:
The Material Support Statute and
Muslim Charities
by MICHAEL G. FREEDMAN*
Introduction
A. The Prosecutor and the Donor
A hypothetical federal prosecutor receives alarming news. A
local computer scientist who has previously donated money to
religious organizations in Pakistan has recently been sharing his
expert knowledge of technology upgrades on websites known to be
frequented by terrorist organizations. The prosecutor believes that
the computer scientist is helping foreign terrorists improve their
technological capabilities for future attacks, and he considers pressing
charges for providing material support to terrorists.
A hypothetical surgeon and his family prepare to visit their
mosque for an annual holiday. Like most residents of his affluent
neighborhood, the surgeon and his family donate generously to the
local schools, athletic teams, and several non-profit organizations.
The surgeon also makes a monetary contribution to his local
mosque's charity each year. This year, he has not only written a
check but has also collected several boxes of old clothes and
textbooks from his children's closets. On the drive to the mosque, his
son half-jokingly reminds him of news reports that Muslim Americans
making similar charitable donations have recently been accused of
providing material support to terrorists.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
A.M., 2008, Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University; B.A., 2005, History, University
of California, San Diego. Thanks to Professor Aaron Rappaport and the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly editors.
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B. The Material Support Law
Unfortunately, neither the prosecutor nor surgeon can make a
properly informed decision regarding how best to proceed in light of
the law prohibiting material support to terrorists. Though important
and frequently used, the law has been controversial throughout its
history and therefore frequently amended as the response to
terrorism has evolved. Rather than clarify the law and its application,
however, these amendments have prolonged the controversy and
have caused further debate and legal challenges.
The most prominent legal challenge, which lasted over a decade,
culminated in June 2010 when the United States Supreme Court
upheld the material support law as applied to particular plaintiffs who
claimed it violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights. In
keeping with the history of the law and the litigation surrounding it,
however, the Court's decision raised at least as many issues as it
resolved. The Court noted that more difficult constitutional issues
may likely arise regarding the law's application. The Court also
broached the difficult issue of monetary donations to charitable
organizations tied to terrorist groups. That particular issue is the
subject of this Note.
C. Muslim Charities and the Need for Reform
The issue of charitable donations highlights the controversy
around the material support law and its application. This controversy
persists despite the Supreme Court's recent decision. The issue's
complexity shows the limitations of the material support law in the
legal fight against terrorism. These limitations apply equally to the
prosecutor and the donor. The law's problems not only hinder
Muslim Americans' religious practices, but also legitimate
government efforts to prosecute offenses related to terrorism. The
case of the Holy Land Foundation, a prominent Muslim charity,
shows the difficulty that prosecutors have faced in using the law. It
also shows the negative repercussions the law has had on the
government's relations with Muslim Americans. This raises not only
constitutional concerns, but also represents a missed opportunity to
strengthen anti-terrorist efforts. This Note focuses on the Holy Land
Foundation to argue that, despite having been upheld as applied to
particular plaintiffs, both the law and its application must still be
reformed. Solving the constitutional debate does not solve the
problematic fact that the law, as it currently stands, does not
adequately serve the needs of either the prosecutor or the donor. Its
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importance in the legal fight against terrorism and the longstanding
controversies with which it is associated also mandate reform for
practical reasons.
D. Structure
This Note comprises four parts. Part One introduces the
material support law and discusses the political and constitutional
debates that have long surrounded it. Part Two presents the case of
the Humanitarian Law Project, the decade-long legal challenge to the
law that resulted in the Supreme Court upholding its constitutionality.
Part Three delves into the issue of Muslim charities, which the
Supreme Court's opinion touches on, and analyzes the case of the
Holy Land Foundation, a prominent Muslim charity that was the
subject of an equally controversial civil action and criminal
prosecution. In light of the problems raised by this analysis, Part
Four concludes with suggestions for reforming the material support
statute in order to reform what remains a problematic law.
I. The Material Support Law
The material support law's current form reflects its controversial
roots and its history of amendments. From its inception, the statute
was at once the subject of heated debate and an important legal tool
in the response to terrorism. As a result, the statute has been
amended several times. It nonetheless remains controversial in its
current form and application. This unsteady legal framework
requires reform.
A. The Current Statute
Three related statutory provisions supply the basis for
prosecuting material support: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C.
Section 2339A prohibits "[p]roviding material support to terrorists;"'
§ 2339B prohibits "[p]roviding material support or resources to
designated foreign terrorist organizations;"2 and § 2339C prohibits
"the financing of terrorism." 3  Both § 2339B 4 and § 2339C'
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2006).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(e)(13).
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incorporate the definition of "material support or resources"
provided by § 2339A:
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine
or religious materials.'
As defined by § 2339A, "the term 'training' means instruction or
teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general
knowledge"' and "the term 'expert advice or assistance' means advice
or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge."
B. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA)
Origins
The history of these three sections is deeply rooted in the
evolving legal approaches to terrorism over the last three decades.
Indeed, in the words of one commentator, the material support
statutes and related debates "seemed to evolve in conjunction with
the changing nature of terrorism itself."9 The material support law
forms a part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ("AEDPA").o AEDPA is often considered a direct response to
the two most prominent terrorist attacks of the 1990s: the bombing of
the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995 and the bombing of the
World Trade Center in 1993." The roots of the provisions enshrined
in the material support law, however, date back to the first half of the
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3).
9. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21 (2005).
10. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 [hereinafter AEDPA) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 19, 21,
22, 28,42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
11. See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY
126 (rev. ed., The New Press 2006) (1999) (describing AEDPA as "an effort to do
something in response to these two crimes.").
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1980s, "when the Reagan Administration sent Congress a bill to make
it a crime to 'support' terrorism."12 Likewise, much of the debate in
the years before AEDPA's passage centered on the same issues that
continue to dominate the debate." For example, early critics
contended that "the guilt by association concept could be redirected
at any time for the foreign policy or internal political purposes of the
government."14
C. The Patriot Act Amendments
The material support law was transformed five years after its
enactment as the legal fight against terrorism evolved in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
In response to those attacks, Congress passed the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("Patriot Act") on October 26,
2001." The Patriot Act "amended AEDPA's definition of 'material
support or resources' to include the prohibition against providing
'expert advice or assistance' to a designated foreign terrorist
organization."1
D. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
Amendments
Congress amended AEDPA again when it enacted the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ("IRTPA") on
December 17, 2004. IRTPA comprised several changes, as reflected
in the current statutory language. IRTPA (1) added a knowledge
requirement to section 2339B;" (2) expanded the definition of
12. Id. at 127.
13. See id. at 128-32 (recounting Congressional hearings).
14. Id. at 131-32.
15. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter Patriot Act] (codified as amended in FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a) and
scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 47, and 50 U.S.C.).
16. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2007)
[hereinafter HLP III] (citing 18 U.S.C. §H 2339A(b), 2339B(g)(4)), amended on denial of
reh'g and reh'g en banc, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009). Where applicable, this Note cites the
various opinions and orders in this litigation according to the abbreviations adopted by the
Ninth Circuit. See HLP III, 509 F.3d at 1126-30.
17. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 6, 18, 18 app., 28, 40, 49, and
50 U.S.C.).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
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"material support or resources" to include "service," "training, expert
advice or assistance," and "personnel;"" (3) defined "training" and
"expert advice or assistance;"" (4) narrowed the definition of
"personnel;" 2 ' and (5) granted the Secretary of State and Attorney
General authority to "approve[]" the provision of "'personnel,'
'training,' or 'expert advice or assistance."' 22
The law has long been at the center of the legal response to
terrorism. Amidst the repeated amendments, for example,
prosecutors "made extensive use" of the material support laws,
charging several dozen individuals under the statute within four years
of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 3 Just as the material
support law has remained a controversial but nonetheless important
legal tool, so too has it been the subject of much debate and litigation.
E. Debates over the Law
The debates surrounding the material support law from its
inception have persisted throughout its evolution. The law has
engendered considerable political debate, featuring perspectives from
across the spectrum. It has also spawned an equally diverse range of
perspectives regarding its constitutionality.
1. The Political Debate
The political debate over the material support law replicates one
of the central debates resulting from the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks-the balance between national security and civil liberties. In
the view of those who focus on national security goals, the domestic
legal system was not fully prepared for dealing with the terrorist
challenge because it was "by and large ... reactive and traditional in
its use of criminal law prior to 9/11, aiming for the capture and
prosecution of those who already had committed harmful acts or
those who could be prosecuted on traditional inchoate crime
grounds." 24 The material support law was part of this traditional legal
framework, but also proved ripe for amendment and novel
applications to deal with the new challenges of prosecuting
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2)-(3).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h).
22. 18 U.S.C. §2339B(j). See also HLP III, 509 F.3d at 1128-29 (discussing each of
these amendments).
23. Chesney, supra note 9, at 19.
24. Id. at 88.
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terrorism.25 Such an approach, however, remains largely reactive,
causing even its supporters to question "whether the support-law
framework truly suffices to address the ever-evolving nature of the
terrorist threat." 26
Such an approach has also alarmed civil libertarians. For
example, critics view the amendments to the material support law and
its frequent use as unfortunate examples of increased "executive
actions in the name of prevention and national security" in a
"perpetual war." 27 According to that view, "to the degree that the
present policies fail to prevent future attacks, further incursions on
civil liberties in the name of national security will undoubtedly gain
momentum from the resulting national apprehension and fear."28
2. The Constitutional Debate
The material support law has also yielded widespread criticism
regarding its constitutionality, particularly with respect to the First
and Fifth Amendments. Even those who consider the law a valuable
legal tool nonetheless recognize the need to "wonder[] if the material
support law unduly infringes constitutional rights." 29 Stronger critics
have argued against the material support approach to responding to
the terrorist challenge, and for an approach in which "we should focus
on perpetrators of crime. .. , avoid indulging in guilt by association,
maintain procedures designed to identify the guilty and exonerate the
innocent. . . ."30 Fierce as the political and theoretical debates are,
many of the same key themes have been addressed more instructively
in court. The next section thus analyzes the constitutionality of the
material support law in greater detail by analyzing the key legal
challenge to the law.
25. Id. at 89 (arguing that "the Justice Department found that capacity not in new
legislation but in the already-existing laws designed to embargo foreign terrorist
organizations. Through creative readings of terms such as 'personnel' and 'training,'
prosecutors provided policymakers with an alternative to the all-too-tempting military
detention option. The material support law . .. thus came to play a central role in the
post-9/11 sleeper cases as well as in the broad run of terrorism related cases.").
26. Id. at 47.
27. George C. Harris, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the
Name of National Security, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135, 149 (2003) (book review).
28. Id.
29. Chesney, supra note 9, at 21.
30. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 11, at x. See also Harris, supra note 27, at 135
(reviewing Cole and Dempsey's critique).
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H. The Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project Case
A. The Case's Origins
The Humanitarian Law Foundation, the named plaintiff, is a self-
described "non-profit organization founded in 1985, dedicated to
protecting human rights and promoting the peaceful resolution of
conflict by using established international human rights laws and
humanitarian law."" The other plaintiffs include five Tamil32
organizations and two United States citizens, including Ralph Fertig,
a former United States Administrative Judge.33 The plaintiffs sought
"to provide support to the humanitarian and political activities of"
two foreign organizations:' (1) the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
("LTIE"), or the Tamil Tigers;3 5 and (2) the Partiya Karkeran
Kurdistan ("PKK"), or the Kurdistan Workers' Party." The
31. Humanitarian Law Project, http:/Ihlp.home.igc.org.
32. The Tamils are an indigenous people of the Indian subcontinent and Sri Lanka.
See JAMES MINAHAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE STATELESS NATIONS: ETHNIC AND
NATIONAL GROUPS AROUND THE WORLD, VOL. IV S-Z, 1844 (2002). Their "campaign
for independence [in Sri Lanka] became one of the world's most violent and long-lasting
separatist wars, and seemingly one of the most intractable." Id. at 1849.
33. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207-08 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
[hereinafter DC-HLP I]; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705,
2708 (2010).
34. DC-HLP I, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1207.
35. Id. at 1209 ("The LTTE was formed in 1976 with the goal of achieving self-
determination for the Tamil residents of Tamil Eelam, the Northern and Eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka. . . . [The LTTE] engages in: (1) political organizing and advocacy;
(2) diplomatic activity; (3) the provision of social services and economic development
through the establishment of a quasi-governmental structure in Tamil Eelam; (4)
humanitarian aid to Tamil refugees fleeing from the Sri Lankan armed forces; and (5)
defense of the Tamil people from human rights abuses. The LTTE also administers a
chain of orphanages in Tamil Eelam, including the Chensoilai and Kantharupan
Orphanages. Through the Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization, the LTTE
supports the development of Tamil Eelam's economy, from agriculture to transportation.
It also regularly issues publications regarding the political situation in Sri Lanka. It
administers a civil police force that maintains public safety in areas under LTTE control.
Finally, the LTTE administers the Tamil Eelam Education Secretariat that oversees
children's educational services.").
36. Id. at 1207-08 ("The PKK was formed approximately 20 years ago with the goal
of achieving self-determination for the Kurds in Southeastern Turkey. It is comprised
primarily of Turkish Kurds. The PKK is the leading political organization representing
the interests of the Kurds in Turkey.... The PKK's efforts on behalf of the Kurds include
political organizing and advocacy and diplomatic activity around the world. It organizes
political forums, international conferences, and cultural festivals outside Turkey to bring
attention to the plight of the Kurds there. It publishes and distributes newspapers and
pamphlets championing the Kurds' cause and denouncing human right violations. It
provides social services and humanitarian aid to Kurds in exile, has established a quasi-
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Secretary of State of the United States designated both groups as
"foreign terrorist organizations" pursuant to AEDPA on October 8,
1997."
Prior to this designation, the Humanitarian Law Foundation and
Judge Fertig had been working with the PKK for several years. As a
result of the designation, they "fear[ed] criminal sanctions" and
"criminal investigation, prosecution, and conviction" for providing
support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.38 The support
that the Humanitarian Law Project and Judge Fertig wished to
provide the PKK included the following: (1) financial contributions
for legal and humanitarian work; (2) international advocacy; (3)
training in legal and political strategy; as well as (4) other forms of
advocacy, support, and cooperation."
Likewise, the other plaintiffs were "deterred" from continuing to
provide the forms of support they had long contributed to the Tamils
in Sri Lanka because of fear of criminal prosecution under AEDPA. 0
The support these groups had previously provided included: financial
contributions for education and humanitarian assistance; food and
clothing; funds for legal fee and political efforts; and advocacy.41
The challenge of striking a balance between such seemingly
innocuous forms of support and the demands of national security is
attested to by the decade-long, and still unsettled, course taken by
this litigation.
B. The Path to the Supreme Court
In its initial order, the district court reached two conclusions
regarding AEDPA's material support provisions. First, the court
held that the plaintiffs had not shown that AEDPA impermissibly
imposed "guilt by association," and therefore denied the plaintiffs'
request for "a preliminary injunction on this claim." 42 In the court's
view, AEDPA only limited the potential ways in which the plaintiffs
could associate with the PKK or LTTE; it did not prohibit association
governmental structure in areas of Turkey under its control, and defends the Kurds from
alleged Turkish human rights abuses.").
37. 62 Fed. Reg. 52,649-51 (Oct. 8, 1997). See also DC-HLP 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1207.
38. DC-HLP I, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1210-11.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1211-12.
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altogether. 43 Applying "an intermediate scrutiny level of review," the
court found that AEDPA (1) was within the government's power; (2)
"further[ed] the government's substantial interest in national security
and foreign relations," which was (3) not related to suppressing the
plaintiffs' right to speech and advocacy; and (4) did not restrict the
plaintiff's "right to political association and expression ... more than
is essential to further [the government's] compelling interest in
national security and foreign policy."' Second, the court
"conclude[d] that the terms 'personnel' and 'training' are
impermissibly vague" because the statute contained no "limitation"
on the terms and "thus .. . criminalizes some of the activities in which
[the] [p]laintiffs have engaged and would like to engage." 45 The court
therefore granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction
with respect to the provision of personnel and training.46
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding on both grounds in March 2000.47
As the appellate court described it, "the issue . . . is the right of
Americans to express their association with foreign political groups
through donations."'
The district court then considered each party's motion for
summary judgment. The government argued that the plaintiffs'
claims were moot because "amendments to the United States
43. Id. at 1212.
44. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (explaining, in a
case concerning the burning of Selective Service registration certificates, that the United
States Supreme "Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear,
the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial;
subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms,
we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.") (internal citations omitted)).
45. DC-HLP I, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1213-15.
46. Id. at 1215 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("[Tlhe loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.")).
47. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
HLP I].
4& Id. at 1134 n.1,
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Attorneys' Manual render[ed] the case non-justiciable." 49  In June
2001, the Department of Justice had amended the United States
Attorneys' Manual to define more narrowly "personnel" and
"training."" The Manual thus "define[d] 'personnel' as individuals
who 'work under the foreign entity's direction or control,' such as
'those acting as full-time or part-time employees or otherwise taking
orders from the entity, are under its direction or control....
Individuals who act independently of the designated foreign terrorist
organization to advance its goals and objectives are not working
under its direction or control.'". Likewise, the definition of
"training" was amended "to cover 'knowingly provid[ing] instruction
to the organization designed to impart one or more specific skills,'
rather than 'general knowledge (e.g., one can receive training in how
to drive a car, but a lecture on the history of the automobile would
not normally be thought of as 'training')."'52 The court, however,
rejected this argument based on its determination that the manual "is
non-binding, unenforceable, and can be amended at any time."s
Turning to the merits of the claims regarding "personnel" and
"training," the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and denied the defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment based on its reasoning that "[b]ecause neither courts nor
United States Attorneys are bound by these narrower definitions, the
statutory language remains impermissibly vague."54
49. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, No. CV 98-1971, 2001 WL 36105333 at *10
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 2,2001).
50. Id. at *2.
51. Id. (quoting United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-91.100 (2001)) (internal
citations omitted).
52. Id. (alteration in original).
53. Id. at *11 (citing United States Attorneys' Manual § 1.1-100 (1997) ("The Manual
provides only internal Department of Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and
may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
by any party in any matter civil or criminal"); United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286,
1294 (9th Cir. 1995) ("failure to strictly comply with the United States Attorneys' Manual
creates no enforceable rights"); United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that United States Attorneys' Manual guidelines do not have the force and
effect of law)).
54. Humanitarian Law Project, 2001 WL 36105333 at *12. Interestingly, the United
States Supreme Court recently rejected a similar argument in United States v. Stevens, 130
S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (citation omitted). Although the government argued that a statute
was not overbroad because the Executive Branch construed it more narrowly than it was
written, the Court "would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the
Government promised to use it responsibly." Id.
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After the Patriot Act added "expert advice and assistance" to the
prohibitions on material support, the plaintiffs filed a new complaint
for a preliminary and permanent injunction on the grounds that the
prohibition "is impermissibly vague and substantially overbroad, fails
to provide adequate notice of prohibited activity, gives government
officials unfettered discretion in enforcement, and causes individuals
to avoid protected First Amendment activity.. . ."" As before, the
court rejected the government's argument that the plaintiffs lacked
standing; the court determined that the plaintiffs had "sufficiently
demonstrated a threat of prosecution" under the material support law
as amended by the Patriot Act." The court granted the plaintiffs
injunctive relief based on its holding that, like "training" and
"personnel," "the term 'expert advice or assistance' is impermissibly
vague.",7 The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the term "is substantially overbroad because it prohibits a substantial
amount of speech activity which is clearly protected by the First
Amendment, such as training in human rights advocacy, giving advice
on how to improve medical care and education, and distributing
human rights literature." 8
The Ninth Circuit then reaffirmed its previous holding that the
prohibition on "training" and "personnel" is "impermissibly
overbroad, and thus void for vagueness under the First and Fifth
Amendments."" The court reasoned "that serious due process
concerns would be raised were we to accept the argument that a
person who acts without knowledge of critical information about a
designated organization presumably acts consistently with the intent
and conduct of that designated organization."" In light of this
concern as well as "the Court's longstanding principles interpreting
the word 'knowingly' to indicate Congress' intent to include a mens
rea requirement," the court "read [section] 2339B to require proof of
knowledge, either of an organization's designation or of the unlawful
activities that caused it to be so designated" and held that "to sustain
a conviction under [section] 2339B, the government must prove
55. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1192-93 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
56. Id. at 1197.
57. Id. at 1201.
58. Id.
59. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 385 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter HLP II].
60. Id. at 396.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the donor had knowledge that the
organization was designated ... as a foreign terrorist organization or
that the donor had knowledge of the organization's unlawful activities
that caused it to be so designated."" The court also rejected the
government's argument regarding the United States Attorneys'
Manual, "[bjecause the United States Attorneys' Manual's expanded
definition is neither accessible to the public nor clear from the
statute. ,62
Following the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act and its amendment of the material support
law, the Ninth Circuit vacated this judgment "regarding the terms
'personnel' and 'training."' 63 The Ninth Circuit also remanded the
case concerning the "expert advice or assistance" prohibition to the
district court for the two cases to be heard together.'
On remand, the parties each raised three issues in their
respective motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs argued that
(1) the absence of a specific intent requirement was a violation of due
process under the Fifth Amendment; (2) IRTPA's amendments of the
definitions of "training," "expert advice or assistance," "personnel,"
and "service" remained "impermissibly vague under the Fifth
Amendment;" and (3) the provision allowing the Secretary of State to
exempt prosecution for support to approved organizations "is an
unconstitutional licensing scheme under the First Amendment." 65 In
response, the government argued that (1) the IRTPA amendments
contained a "constitutionally sufficient" mens rea requirement; (2)
"the terms 'training,' 'expert advice or assistance,' 'personnel,' and
'service' are neither vague nor overbroad under the First and Fifth
Amendments in relation to [the] [p]laintiffs' own conduct;" and (3)
"the IRTPA amendments do not grant the government
unconstitutional licensing authority."" The district court held that (1)
the lack of a specific intent requirement is not a due process violation;
(2) "the terms 'training,' 'expert advice or assistance,' and 'service'
are impermissibly vague" but "the term 'personnel' is not
61. Id. at 402-03.
62. Id. at 405.
63. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 393 F.3d 902, 903 (9th Cir.
2004).
64. Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139 (C.D. Cal.
2005) [hereinafter DC-HLP III]; see also HLP III, 509 F.3d at 1129.
65. DC-HLP III, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1141-42.
66. Id. at 1142.
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impermissibly vague;" (3) none of the terms are overbroad; and (4)
the exemption provision "is not an unconstitutional licensing scheme
under the First Amendment.""
The parties then appealed once more to the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed the judgment of the district court. Following the Ninth
Circuit's final decision, the United States Supreme Court granted the
government's petition for a writ of certiorari and heard oral argument
in early 2010.6
C. The Supreme Court's Ruling
After over a decade of litigation,' the case was ultimately
decided by the United States Supreme Court, which upheld the
material support law as applied to the plaintiffs and the activities in
which they wished to engage.70 Importantly, the Court declined to
"address the resolution of more difficult cases that may arise under
the statute in the future.""
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the statute is
impermissibly vague for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 72  As the Court noted, "'[a] conviction fails to
comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails
to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages
seriously discriminatory enforcement." 73  "[A] more stringent
vagueness test" applies, however, when a statute allegedly interferes
with free speech.74 According to the Court, the Ninth Circuit had
improperly "merged plaintiffs' vagueness challenge with their First
Amendment claims."" In fact, a Fifth Amendment vagueness
challenge does not turn on any First Amendment claim that a plaintiff
67. Id.
68. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
69. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-16 (2010) [hereinafter
HLP] (summarizing case's procedural history).
70. Id. at 2708.
71. Id. at 2712.
72. Id. at 2719-20.
73. Id. at 2718 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
74. Id. at 2719 (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 495 (1982)).
75. Id. at 2719.
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may also bring." Analyzing the statute under the Fifth Amendment
alone, the Court rejected the vagueness challenge because it
determined that the statute's terms "are quite different from the sorts
of terms that we have previously declared to be vague."77  Unlike
those terms, the material support statute's terms "do[] not require ...
untethered, subjective judgments."78 In support of this reasoning, the
Court noted that Congress had carefully "add[ed] narrowing
definitions to the material-support statute over time. These
definitions increased the clarity of the statute's terms."7 Nonetheless,
the Court reiterated that "the scope of the material-support statute
may not be clear in every application.,o
Turning to the First Amendment issue, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that "their support will advance only the
legitimate activities of the designated terrorist organizations, not their
terrorism."" The Court noted Congress's finding that "foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization
facilitates that conduct."' Following this view, the Court reasoned
that this "support frees up other resources within the organization
that may be put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend
legitimacy to foreign terrorists groups-legitimacy that makes it
easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise
funds-all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks." Such
reasoning was based not only on Congress's findings, but also
academic studies of terrorist organizations such as Hamas.' The
Court rejected the dissent's contention that "there is 'no natural
stopping place"' for such logic, arguing instead that "Congress has
settled on just such a stopping place: The statute reaches only
material support coordinated with or under the direction of a
76. Id. at 2719 (citing Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 and Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-
95, 497).
77. Id., at 2720.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2724 (citing Brief for Plaintiffs, 51-52).
82. Id. at 2735 (quoting AEDPA, §§ 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1247, note following 18
U.S.C. §§ 2339B (Findings and Purpose)) (bracketing and emphasis in original).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2725 (citing M. Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the
Service of Jihad 2-3 (2006)).
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designated foreign terrorist organization."" Further acknowledging
what it deemed Congress's "careful balancing of interests," the Court
noted that limited exceptions to the material-support prohibition
exist, such as for "medicine and religious materials.""
While the Court thus acknowledged that future constitutional
concerns may likely arise, it dismissed potential concerns regarding
charitable donations. It did so, moreover, with a relatively broad
generalization about the relationship between terrorist organizations
as charity. As the next part of this Note argues, this issue is complex
and the lack of understanding has not only raised constitutional
concerns but hampered efforts to successfully prosecute terrorism
related offenses under the material support law.
III. Muslim Charities and the Material Support Law
A. Charity and the War on Terror
Speaking in Cairo in June 2009, President Barack Obama
acknowledged that the United States' "rules on charitable giving have
made it harder for Muslims to fulfill their religious obligation" and
explained that he is "committed to working with American Muslims
to ensure that they can fulfill zakat."" In doing so, he addressed a key
problem in the war on terror.
Over the last decade, the United States government has
attempted to fight terrorism in part by fighting the financing that
makes it possible. Its legal approach has led to undeniable successes
against terrorist financing, but has been problematic when viewed in
the broader context of the war on terror. Success against the direct
target of financing has often come at the expense of the larger goals.
For example, the 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes the
importance of gathering intelligence about terrorist financing in order
to better understand how terrorist networks work.' Because the legal
approach has lacked a clear strategy, it has alienated Muslim
Americans and left them critical of the government, as the President
85. Id. at 2726.
86. Id. at 2728 (citing § 2339A(b)(1)).
87. President Barack Obama, The President's Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning
(June 4, 2009).
88. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
THE 9/11 COMMIsSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 382 (2004).
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recognized.' They are reluctant to engage with the government even
though they could provide helpful information. More directly, the
legal approach to terrorist financing has undercut its own goals
because many Muslim Americans are so wary of the government that
they now donate exclusively in cash," which complicates government
efforts to track the flow of funds. Although these effects are not so
problematic as to condemn the government's approach, they
nonetheless illustrate how the fight against terrorist financing has at
times made the broader war on terrorism more difficult.
An improved legal strategy would allow the government to more
effectively fight terrorist financing in tandem with the war on terror's
broader goals. Fulfilling the President's commitment would not
merely appease Muslim Americans. It would also allow the
government to cooperate with Muslim Americans, which would make
possible the better understanding of terrorist financing and terrorist
networks recommended by the 9/11 Commission Report. The
starting point for such a strategy is an analysis of the legal approach
the government has taken thus far that identifies which aspects of the
approach most effectively achieve the related goals of fighting
terrorist financing while allowing Muslim Americans to satisfy their
religious obligations.
Understanding the importance of charity in Islam and the
important role Muslim charities play in the United States helps show
why the legal approach has been problematic. Charitable giving is a
key religious duty for Muslims. The charitable organizations that
collect and distribute Muslim charitable giving in the United States,
however, have a complex, dual nature. They perform a legitimate
religious task, but they also have ties to terrorist organizations in
certain instances.
89. Various commentary and reports show that Muslim Americans feel they are being
unfairly persecuted, denied religious freedoms, and falsely associated with terrorists. See,
e.g., Salam Al-Marayati, Indict Individuals, Not Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002
("[tlhe government's policy has inflicted considerable harm. By effectively shutting down
these charities, it has given Americans the false impression that American Muslims are
supporting terrorists. It has also given the Muslim world a similarly false impression that
America is intolerant of a religious minority."); see also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY: CHILLING MUSLIM CHARITABLE
GIVING IN THE 'WAR ON TERRORISM FINANCING' 7 (2009) (describing "a pattern of
conduct that violated the fundamental rights of American Muslim charities and has chilled
American Muslims' charitable giving in accordance with their faith, seriously undermining
American values of due process and commitment to First Amendment freedoms.").
90. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 89, at 16.
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A successful legal strategy against terrorist financing must
account for this complexity. Certain legal causes of action that may
be appropriate against terrorist entities have proven more
problematic when applied to Muslim charities. Likewise, while
criminal laws against terrorism have been used successfully against
charities, their use has often engendered considerable controversy. A
better legal approach to terrorist financing must be based on a
strategy that takes into account the necessarily related goals of
stopping terrorist financing and allowing Muslim Americans to fulfill
their charitable obligations.
B. Zakat
A legal strategy that effectively fights terrorist financing and
allows the government to respect Muslim Americans, and possibly
work with them to gather information, must begin by considering the
importance and complexities of Muslim charity in the United States.
1. What is Zakat?
Exploring the deep roots of charity in Islam illustrates why
Muslim Americans have felt so negatively impacted by the
government's approach over the last decade. Such an exploration
must begin with the concept President Obama highlighted in his
Cairo speech, zakat.
Zakat, one of Islam's five pillars," is a requirement for charitable
giving. The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam defines it as an "alms-tax"
and explains that the Qur'an stresses "the practice of benevolence as
one of the chief virtues of the true believer."" Muslims who can
afford to do so are required to donate two and a half percent of their
total assets annually as zakat. According to the Oxford Dictionary of
Islam:
To practicing Muslims, zakah93 connotes the path to purity,
comprehension of material responsibility, and an enhanced
sense of spirituality. Zakah is used for the needy, for
propagation of the faith, to free slaves, to relieve debtors, to
help travelers, and for the administration of zakah, as well as
91. See generally MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION, 147-
50 (1997). Islam's four other pillars are Shahada: declaration of faith ("there is no god but
God. Muhammad is the Messenger of God"); Salar worship or prayer; Sawm: the fast
during Ramadan; and Hajj: pilgrimage to Mecca.
92. H.A.R. GIBB & J.H. KRAMERS, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, 654 (2001).
93. Zakah is a variation in the transliteration of the term from Arabic to English.
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other efforts approved by religious authorities. The primary
forms of wealth subject to zakah include gold, silver, livestock,
agricultural produce, articles of trade, currency, shares and
bonds, and other liquid assets.9 4
The word zakat derives from the Arabic root zaka, meaning "to
be pure," which itself derives from the Aramaic zakut, meaning
virtue, giving, and pious gift.95 The Hebrew term sadaka has an
almost identical meaning in Judaism." The Qur'an distinguishes
between zakat and sadaqa, however. Sadaqa is used for voluntary
giving akin to charity, while zakat is used for the obligatory alms
required by Islam.'
The distinction turns in part on Islam's growth into a political
state. According to one scholar, the voluntary sadaqa was practiced
from the beginning of Islam in Mecca, whereas the obligatory zakat
developed in Medina where Islam first took on the trappings of a
political state." According to H.A.R. Gibb, a leading Western
scholar of Islam, throughout the life of Muhammad, Islam's prophet
and founder, there was an organized system for receiving and
distributing gifts. This system not only supported the needy, but also
supported Islam's early military and political achievements." Under
Muhammad's successor, Abu Bakr, zakat became a permanent
system tied to the state treasury, and "contributed greatly to the
expansion of Muslim power."'oo
2. The Evolution of Charitable Organizations
Far from simply a historic concept, zakat has remained a vital
aspect of Muslims' experience in the modern era. For much of
Islam's history, Muslim governments collected and distributed zakat
according to what Malise Ruthven, an expert on Islam, calls "pre-
established patterns." In the present era, however, it is "left to the
believer's conscience."'0o
94. THE OXFORD DICrIONARY OF ISLAM 345 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003).
95. GIBB & KRAMERS, supra note 92, at 654.
96. Id.
97. NU'MAN IBN MUHAMMAD, ABU HANIFAH, DA 'A' IM AL-ISLAM OF AL-QADI
AL-NU'MAN: THE PILLARS OF ISLAM 299 n.1 (Asaf A. A. Fyzee trans., Ismail Kurban
Husein Poonawala revised and annotated, 2002).
98. Id.
99. GIBB & KRAMERS, supra note 91, at 654.
100. Id. at 655.
101. RUTHVEN, supra note 91, at 147-48.
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According to the Encyclopedia of Islam in the United States,
Muslim Americans have "traditionally satisfied the requirement of
zakat and coordinated voluntary charitable activities through their
local mosques," whose programs range from "simple collection boxes
to more elaborate community service programs."" To broaden the
scale and reach of charitable programs, Muslim Americans began
establishing "national charities independently of mosques and local
community centers in the 1980s."1o3
3. Ties to Terrorism
The growth of these large-scale charities, however, has
occasionally led to problematic ties to terrorist organizations for
several reasons. The skills that have made national and international
Muslim charities successful-raising large amounts of money and
distributing funds throughout the world-are skills upon which
terrorist organizations also rely. Likewise, Muslim charities often
focus their efforts on parts of the world where terrorist groups are
active. Finally, terrorist organizations themselves often have social or
charitable wings to raise or receive charity.
The Haramain Foundation is a good example of the dual purpose
such organizations often serve. The Haramain Foundation is an
international Muslim charity headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
that, at its peak, raised fifty million dollars annually through nearly
fifty branches worldwide." At least ten of these branches, however,
provided financing and arms to terrorist groups, according to the
United States. In particular, the Haramain Foundation was linked to
the 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
as well as the 2002 Kenya hotel bombing."
Thus, while zakat remains a core requirement of Islam, Muslim
charities that coordinate zakat in the United States often have a
problematic dual nature. The principal challenge in fashioning an
effective legal approach to terrorist financing, then, is to understand
this dual purpose in order to effectively balance the need to fight
terrorism with the need to allow Muslims to fulfill their foundational
religious duties. The experience of the Holy Land Foundation for
Relief and Development, the most prominent Muslim charity in the
102. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM IN THE UNITED STATES 130 (Jocelyne Cesari ed.
2007).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 131.
105. Id.
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United States, shows several of the problems of this approach. First,
civil actions by private individuals are the least effective tactic
because they are based on a weak legal argument whose application
to Muslim charities has failed to achieve tangible results. Second,
even when criminal prosecutions of Muslim charities have been
successful, this success is hard-won because of difficulties in proving
liability and because of controversies regarding the underlying law.
The experience of the Holy Land Foundation thus shows that the
government's legal approach to terrorist financing over the last
decade has not achieved the broader goals of the war on terrorism as
effectively as possible, and that a legal strategy centered around
executive action is the best way to achieve these goals.
C. The Holy Land Foundation and Hamas
The Holy Land Foundation ("HLF") is the best example of a
Muslim charity in the United States because it at once exemplifies the
prominence and successes achieved by Muslim charities as well as the
ties such charities often have to terrorists
1. HLF's Origins
In 1988, a group of Palestinians with ties to Hamas formed a non-
profit, tax exempt, charitable organization in California to assist the
needy in the West Bank and Gaza. The group was called the
Occupied Land Fund. In 1992, it relocated to Richardson, Texas,
where it incorporated as the HLF.
By 2001, HLF was the largest Muslim charity in the United
States.o According to the New York Times, the group was "a
modern and prosperous philanthropic machine, thriving in the
mainstream" that:
employed all the tools of modern fund-raising, setting up
automatic bank withdrawals for donors and matching gift
programs with corporations like American Express and Home
Depot. Donors could give online, or by shopping at popular
106. Indictment at 10, United States v. Holy Land Foundation, No. 304-CR-240G
(N.D. Texas July 26, 2004). The President, Secretary, and Chief Executive Officer was
Shukri abu Baker. Id. at 11. The Chairman of the Board for the first decade was
Muhammad el-Mezain. Id. at 12. El-Mezain became the Director of Endowments in
approximately 1999. Id. The original treasurer was Ghassan Elashi. Id. at 13. Elashi
replaced el-Mezain as Chairman of the Board in approximately 1999. Id.
107. David Firestone, After a Long, Slow Climb to Respectability, a Muslim Charity
Experiences a Rapid Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2001.
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Web sites like Amazon.com that have charitable affiliation
programs. Like many Christian charities, it allowed
contributors to sponsor a Palestinian orphan for a set monthly
amount, then regularly receive photographs and letters from
the child, often with a political edge.'
In 2000, HLF raised more than $13 million.'w In the same year, it
gave away $5 million: half to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza,
and the other half to refugees in Chechnya, Kosovo, Jordan, and
Lebanon as well as to Turkish earthquake victims."o HLF also
performed charity within the United States. It opened a food pantry
in Paterson, New Jersey, in 1999, established hospitals, schools, and a
charitable program, and organized donations of money and blood to
victims of the Oklahoma City bombing."'
2. HLF's Ties to Hamas
At the same time, however, HLF had ties to the terrorist group
Hamas.112 Such ties highlight the complicated dual purpose of Muslim
charities discussed in the previous section.
Hamas itself has dual purposes. In addition to its military wing,
Hamas also has a social wing that administers social services to
Palestinians throughout the West Bank and Gaza."' It administers
these social services in part through Zakat committees that raise and
distribute Muslim charity."4 In fact, the majority of Hamas's annual
10& Id.
109. Id.
110. Laurie Goodstein, Mideast Flare-Up: Muslims; 8 Groups in U.S. Protest Bush
Move Against Foundation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001.
111. Angela Starita, On The Map: Following Muslim Charity and Dietary Laws, Food
for the Needy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999.
112. Hamas was founded in 1987. Indictment, supra note 105, at 1. Its name derives
from an acronym based on its full name, Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya, which
means the Islamic Resistance Movement. Id. President Clinton designated Hamas a
specially designated global terrorist organization in 1995. Id. at 8. The Secretary of State
designated Hamas a foreign terrorist organization in 1997. Id. at 9. The Clinton
administration designated Hamas's then-Political Bureau Chief Mousa Abu Marzook a
specially designated global terrorist on August 29, 1995, and the Bush Administration
designated the current Political Bureau Chief a specially designated global terrorist on
August 22, 2003. Id. at 8. The indictment is referred to throughout because it provides a
clear and concise account of the relevant aspects of Hamas' origins and structure. Several
books provide further detail and analysis. E.g., PAUL McGEOUGH, KILL KHALID: THE
FAILED MOSSAD ASSASSINATION OF KHALID MISHAL AND THE RISE OF HAMAS (2009).
113. Indictment, supra note 106, at 2.
114. Id. at 4.
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operating budget, which ranges from $20 million to $70 million, goes
to this legitimate charitable work."'
Much of Hamas's work is illegitimate, however. Aside from the
fact that the rest of the budget goes to the militant wing for terrorist
attacks, even some of the charitable funds are indirectly tied to
terrorism. According to U.S. authorities, Hamas's charitable work
also served as a recruiting tool for the organization's militant goals."'
For example, a Hamas leader estimated that the group spent between
$2 million to $3 million a month on payments to the families of
victims of Israeli violence."' It likewise made payments to the
families of suicide bombers."'
HLF had financial ties to Hamas from the start. In its first years
of existence, HLF sent hundreds of thousands of dollars to Hamas."9
Likewise, two HLF leaders attended a meeting with Hamas leaders in
Philadelphia in October 1993 that the FBI monitored via electronic
surveillance.'20 The meeting's "attendees acknowledged the need to
avoid scrutiny by law enforcement officials in the United States by
masquerading their operations under the cloak of charitable
exercise." 2' An FBI memorandum later described how the HLF
attendees "mentioned that the United States provided them with a
secure, legal base from which to operate."122
HLF recognized the problem posed by these ties to Hamas. It
employed public relations advisers and was represented by the
prominent Arab-American attorney George Salem, a partner at Akin
Gump and the liaison to Arab Americans for George W. Bush's
presidential campaign.123
115. McGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 300.
116. Id. at 300 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, U.S. Designates Five
Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities (Aug. 22,
2003)).
117. McGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 300 (citing Lee Hockstader, Palestinians Find
Heroes in Hamas; Popularity Surges for Once-Marginal Sponsor of Suicide-Bombings,
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 11, 2001).
118. Judith Miller, U.S. Contends Muslim Charity Is Tied to Hamas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 2000.
119. Indictment, supra note 106, at 18. Before incorporating in 1988, HLF sent
approximately $100,000 to Abu Marzook. Id. Between April 1989 and October 1989,
HLF sent another $725,000 to a Gaza account established and used by Hamas's spiritual
founder, Ahmed Yassin. Id.
120. Indictment, supra note 106, at 20; Firestone, supra notel07.
121. Indictment, supra note 106, at 20.
122. Firestone, supra note 107.
123. Id.
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As a result of these ties to Hamas, the United States government
was suspicious of HLF before September 11, 2001. In August 2000,
for example, the State Department asked the United States Agency
for International Development to withdraw HLF's registration as a
charitable organization based on concerns over its payments to the
families of Palestinian suicide bombers.'24 Similarly, in June 2000,
New York state authorities began an investigation into HLF's
possible ties to Hamas.m
It was not until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
however, that HLF became a key government target in the newly
launched war on terror and terrorist financing.
D. The Civil Action against HLF
The first legal mechanism used against HLF was a civil action
premised on HLF's causal link to a Hamas terrorist attack. The civil
action against HLF reveals several problems with using this tool to
fight terrorist financing. The primary problem is that the legal basis
for extending the causal chain to charities such as HLF is weak. As a
result, to prove liability, private parties must base their individual
claims on criminal statutes, whose enforcement is better left to the
government. Lastly, as a practical matter it is difficult for individuals
to successfully collect from charities like HLF. Rather, any victories
are primarily symbolic. Therefore, the civil action against HLF shows
that this problematic tool is largely ineffective and should not
comprise a part of the government's legal strategy against terrorist
financing.
1. The Boims' Civil Action
Joyce and Stanley Boim, U.S. citizens, brought a civil action
against HLF in the United States after a Hamas gunman murdered
their teenage son David, a U.S. and Israeli citizen, in Jerusalem in
1996. They based their claim on a novel interpretation of the material
126 dfi
support statute. The difficulty they faced in prevailing against HLF
on that claim highlights the problems in fighting terrorist financing
through civil actions.
124. Miller, supra note 118.
125. Susan Saulny, Spitzer Seeks to Force Fund-Raising Data From An Islamic Charity,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001.
126. 18 U.S.C. H§ 2331-38.
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The Boims' claim rested on a 1992 law that allowed for civil
actions against individuals and organizations by victims of acts of
international terrorism.127 The law was enacted in response to the
killing of Leon Klinghoffer by Palestinian militants aboard the Achille
Lauro in the 1980s.'" It allows for "the imposition of liability at any
point along the causal chain of terrorism [that] would interrupt, or at
least imperil, the flow of money." 129  It was intended to "deter
terrorist groups from maintaining assets in the United States, from
benefitting from investments in the United States, and from soliciting
funds from within the United States."13
Before the Boims, although Americans had won civil actions
against Hamas and state sponsors of terrorism, none had ever been
able to actually collect damages from foreign terrorist organizations
or states. Two families of American victims of Hamas attacks had
been awarded a combined $330 million in damages by United States
courts, but they lacked a way to enforce these default judgments.131
Likewise, a New Jersey family whose daughter died in a 1995
bombing in Gaza had won a $247.5 million verdict against the
government of Iran but had no way to collect from a foreign
government.13 2
The Boim case is unique because the Boims did not target just
Hamas, but rather attempted to stretch the chain of causation to
impose liability on HLF as well. The Boims were frustrated that U.S.
authorities would not pursue a criminal case against the Hamas
gunmen whom Palestinian police had arrested, so they turned to
attorney Nathan Lewin.133 In the words of Paul McGeough, "Lewin
ventured legally where others had not dared, cherry-picking statute
and precedent law to build a case of far greater consequence than
nailing a couple of lowly Hamas killers on the West Bank."'m
127. Id.
128. Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of Terrorism
and its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global
Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1428 (2004); see also MCGEOUGH, supra
note 112, at 296.
129. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-38.
130. Crimm, supra note 128, at 1428.
131. MCGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 296.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 297.
134. Id. at 296-299. Lewin was inspired by the example of Morris Dees, who won a
$37.8 million verdict against the Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan for a 1995 church
burning in South Carolina.
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Lewin and the Boims filed suit in federal court in Chicago in
2000. In addition to the two killers already in custody, they named
HLF as a defendant, along with another private organization, the
Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI")." The Boims claimed that HLF
and QLI had illegally provided material support and resources to
Hamas and that they laundered charitable contributions from the
United States to Hamas to finance terrorist attacks.136 They sought
$100 million in compensatory damages and $100 million in punitive
damages, along with attorneys' fees and treble damages as authorized
by the statute.
2. The Trial and Appeals
Before trial, HLF appealed to the Seventh Circuit on the
grounds that the Boims could not show a direct connection between
HLF and David Boim's killing. 138 By the time the Seventh Circuit
heard the appeal, the September 11 attacks had occurred and the war
on terror had begun. As McGeough writes, "[i]n as long as it took for
four hijacked airplanes to crash into the Twin Towers in Manhattan,
the Pentagon in Washington, and a field in Pennsylvania, the import
of the Boim case shifted from a single shooting at a bus stop in
Jerusalem to the rights of the families of the thousands who had died
in the 9/11 attacks."" 9 The court thus sought the opinion of the
Department of Justice, which supported the Boims' novel legal theory
and argued that the statute was intended to allow a suit against
anyone in the causal chain of a terrorist act.'m The Seventh Circuit
allowed the Boims' action to proceed, but nonetheless pointed out
several problems with their legal argument. In part based on the
government's brief, the court recognized that "the statute is clearly
meant to reach beyond those persons who themselves commit the
violent act that directly causes the injury." 41  However, it also
reasoned that "[t]o say that funding simpliciter constitutes an act of
terrorism is to give the statute an almost unlimited reach" that "might
135. Id. at 300.
136. Crimm, supra note 128, at 1430.
137. Id.
138. David Firestone, Traces of Terror: The Charity, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2002),
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904EEDD163DF935A35755
COA9649C8B63&scp=1&sq=traces%20of%20terror:%20the%20charity&st=cse.
139. MCGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 308.
140. Id. at 308-09.
141. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim 1), 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002).
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also lead to constitutional infirmities by punishing mere association
with groups that engage in terrorism."142 The court therefore held
that the Boims' theory of liability based on funding Hamas was
"insufficient because it sets too vague a standard, and because it does
not require a showing of proximate cause." 143  The court held, in
agreement with the government's brief, however, that liability for
aiding and abetting international terrorism was inherent in the law.4
The court also held that the Boims could attempt to establish HLF's
civil liability by proving its criminal liability for provision of material
support to terrorist organizations.45
At trial, the court granted summary judgment for the Boims
against HLF because it found that HLF was collaterally estopped
from denying it had provided material support to Hamas because it
had lost on the same claim in its challenge to the government's
designation of it as a terrorist group, as discussed in section six of this
paper.'" The jury then returned a $52 million verdict against the
Quranic Literacy Institute, which the court tripled to $156 million
pursuant to the statute.47  The trial court also deemed the other
defendants jointly and severally liable for these damages.'4
On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit overruled the grant of
summary judgment against HLF, holding that the district court erred
in its finding of collateral estoppel.149 The Seventh Circuit explained
that the D.C. Circuit's holding in the designation challenge did not
actually establish HLF's knowledge of Hamas's terrorist activities or
intent to support such activities as required for civil liability.' It thus
remanded on the question of HLF's civil liability because there had
not yet been any finding that HLF's financial support of Hamas
caused Boim's death."' The court concluded dramatically, noting
that:
142. Id. (emphasis in original).
143. Id. at 1012.
144. Id. at 1016-17.
145. Id. at 1016.
146. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim II), 340 F. Supp 2d 885, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(citing Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
147. Boim v. Holy Land Found. (Holy Land 1), 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2007),
vacated on grant of rehearing and rehearing en banc, Boim v. Holy Land Found. (Holy
Land II), 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
148. Holy Land I, 511 F.3d at 710 n.1.
149. Id. at 710.
150. Id. at 730-31.
151. Id. at 733.
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[blelief, assumption, and speculation are no substitutes for
evidence in a court of law ... [w]e must resist the temptation to
gloss over error, admit spurious evidence, and assume facts not
adequately proved simply to side with the face of innocence and
against the face of terrorism. .. no matter how great our desire
to hold someone accountable for the unspeakably evil acts that
ended David Boim's life.'52
Upon rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit upheld the verdict, but
agreed with the initial panel that the Boims had not proven HLF's
liability.'
3. The Ineffectiveness of Civil Actions Under the Material Support Law
The Boims' attempt to impose civil liability on HLF was
ineffective with respect to both the Boims' goal and the broader goal
of fighting terrorist financing. Through their novel reading of the law,
the Boims attempted to turn it into an effective tool against terrorist
financers. Before the Boim case, private parties had been unable to
actually collect the huge sums in damages they won from terrorist
groups like Hamas. The Boims attempted to solve this problem by
going after Muslim charities as well. However, although the Seventh
Circuit upheld the jury's verdict, it remanded on the issue of HLF's
liability. The decision on remand is yet unclear, but the United States
Supreme Court recently declined to hear the Boims' appeal on the
liability of one of the individual defendants.154 Thus, after eight years
of litigation, the Boims are no closer to collecting damages than other
families were under the prior reading of the statute. Despite their
novel reading of the statute, they have been unable to actually prove
HLF's liability through its fundraising. As before, any damages
remain purely symbolic and do not actually help stop terrorist
financing.
Beyond the Boims' failure to achieve their own goals, their civil
action also highlights the problems of such an approach as a tactic in
the broader strategy against terrorist financing. The Boims' civil
action depended heavily on the material support law. The Seventh
152. Id. at 757. See also MCGEOUGH supra note 112, at 395.
153. Holy Land II, 549 F.3d at 700 (citing Holy Land 1, 511 F.3d at 720-33).
154. Supreme Court Denies Appeal for Terror Victim, JTA, Oct. 21, 2009, http://jta.org/
news/article/2009/10/21/1008626/us-court-denies-appeal-for-american-victim-of-terror-in-israel.
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Circuit originally allowed the Boims to attempt to impose civil
liability on HLF if they could show HLF violated the criminal
prohibition on material support. However, imposing criminal liability
is the government's job, and not the job of individual citizens.
Indeed, the government prosecuted HLF for this very offense while
the Boim litigation was proceeding. The government's prosecution of
HLF led to a conviction and thus achieved the goal that the Boims'
civil action was incapable of achieving. Even if the Boims had
prevailed in imposing civil liability based on a criminal offense, HLF's
penalty would be merely financial and thus less effective than the
heavy prison sentences the government won in its criminal
prosecution.
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit overturned the trial court's ruling
that the Boims could rely on the D.C. Circuit's ruling in the seizure
case to collaterally estop HLF's defense and win summary judgment
against it. As with the criminal prosecution, targeting the assets of
terrorist financers is a job for the government, and not for private
actors. Similarly, even when the government successfully froze HLF's
assets, the Seventh Circuit found that this was insufficient to also
establish civil liability.
Although the same constitutional controversies plagued this civil
case, individual citizens were nonetheless able to creatively apply the
criminal statute as a basis for an equally controversial civil verdict.
Were the constitutional controversies regarding the material support
statutes fully resolved, perhaps such civil actions could potentially
play a beneficial role in the response to terrorism. But until those
controversies are fully resolved, such civil actions only engender
further controversy regarding the reach and application of the
statutes. Moreover, as discussed, the material support statutes
originated in the national security context and are designed to be
used by federal prosecutors in the legal fight against terrorism.
Actions such as the Boims', however, have found support despite
their clearly problematic nature. At the very least, Congress should
provide clearer guidelines as to how, if at all, the material support
statute may give rise to a civil cause of action. Ideally, however,
Congress should limit all such civil actions, at least until the
155. See, e.g., John D. Shipman, Note, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal
Examination of the New Front in the War on Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REV. 526, 571 (2008)
(arguing that "[w]ith Congress by their side, victims of terrorism should be permitted to
seek justice in any venue where it can be dispensed, despite any political or diplomatic
ramifications.").
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controversies surrounding the underlying material support statute
have been decisively settled.
E. The Prosecution of HLF
Although imposing criminal liability on terrorist financers is best
left to the government, the government's prosecution of HLF shows
that this legal mechanism has led to considerable controversy even
when successful. Although it has been effective in achieving the
direct goal of stopping terrorist financing, the controversies it causes
also make the broader goals of the war on terror more difficult to
achieve. While the government successfully used this mechanism
against HLF, its use of this mechanism also did more to alienate
Muslim Americans than its use of the other two mechanisms. Despite
such concerns, the government must prosecute criminal activity where
it exists, but the prosecution of HLF nonetheless shows the problems
associated with this mechanism and suggests that it may need reform
and should be used only when essential.
1. The Government's Case
In 2004, the government charged HLF and its leaders with forty-
two criminal offenses for materially supporting terrorism."' The
government's core charge was that HLF funneled money through
West Bank zakat committees controlled by Hamas to pay family
members of suicide bombers. Attorney General John Ashcroft
remarked that "[t]oday, a U.S.-based charity, that claims to do good
works, is charged with funding works of evil." He explained that
"[f]or the past 33 months, the Department of Justice has used every
tool within the law to identify, disrupt and dismantle terrorist
networks and those organizations that supply the blood money that
makes such murderous acts possible."1 7 Ashcroft continued:
To those who exploit good hearts to fund secretly violence and
murder, this prosecution sends a clear message: There is no
distinction between those who carry out terrorist attacks and
156. Those arrested included: abu Baker, Elashi, Abdulqader, el-Mezain, and
Abdulrahman Odeh. In addition to the material support charge, the defendants were also
charged with money laundering, conspiracy, and tax fraud. See Eric Lichtblau, Arrests Tie
Charity Group to Palestinian Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2004), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/07/28/politics/28terror.html?scp=1&sq=arrests%20tie%20charity
%20group&st=cse.
157. John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John
Ashcroft: Holy Land Foundation Indictment (July 27, 2004).
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those who knowingly finance terrorist attacks. The United
States will ensure that both terrorists and their financiers meet
158the same, certain justice.
The trial began on July 16, 2007, and the prosecution built its
case around the argument that HLF donations were distributed
through Hamas-controlled zakat committees, which allowed Hamas
to use its other resources for terrorism.' Prosecutors had compiled
more than one million pages of documents and thousands of hours of
surveillance recordings." They presented more than 1,000 exhibits
and almost two months of testimony.16' According to the prosecution,
HLF had raised over $57 million since its founding in 1989 and had
sent $36 million to the West Bank and Gaza.1 62 The prosecution
called two Israeli intelligence agents who testified anonymously that
HLF was one part of a global Hamas finance network and that
Hamas controlled the zakat committees to which HLF sent funds.
On cross-examination, however, one agent admitted he did not know
who was in charge of the zakat committees at the time when HLF
transferred funds and that British and Dutch authorities had cleared
other groups that donated to the committees for lack of evidence."
The defense's witness Edward Abington, formerly the second-
highest ranking intelligence official at the State Department, testified
that during his tenure as consul general in Jerusalem in the 1990s, he
received daily CIA briefings and visited the zakat committees but had
never been aware that the zakat committees were part of Hamas.
Despite the government's overwhelming evidence, its case faced
a challenge similar to the Boims' with respect to proving the
connection between HLF and Hamas. The government was unable
to convince jurors either that Hamas controlled the accounts to which
the Holy Land Foundation made donations or that the Holy Land
158. Id.
159. MCGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 384.
160. Id. at 383.
161. Leslie Eaton, No Convictions in Trial Against Muslim Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2007), available at http//www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22us/22cnd-holyland.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=
No%2OConvictions%20in%2(TTrial%20Against%20Muslim%20Charity&st=cse.
162. McGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 383-84.
163. Id. at 387.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Foundation intended to provide support for terrorism.'" The jury was
not convinced that Hamas controlled the zakat committees. The jury
acquitted three defendants of virtually all charges and deadlocked
with respect to two others.' One juror told a reporter, "I kept
expecting the government to come up with something, and they never
did. From what I saw, this was about Muslims raising money to
support Muslims, and I don't see anything wrong with that."'" When
the judge polled the jurors, three disputed the forewoman's account
of the deliberations so the judge had them return for further
deliberation. When they failed to reach a verdict upon further
deliberation, the judge declared a mistrial for all the defendants."9
Commentators from a range of perspectives agreed that the
prosecution had been a failure. One critic argued that "[i]t suggests
the government is really pushing beyond where the law justifies them
going."' The former United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of Texas, where the trial occurred, called the verdict "a stunning
setback for the government ... a two-by-four in the middle of the
forehead."' Likewise, the Undersecretary of the Treasury at the
time of the asset freeze called the verdict "the continuation of what I
now see as a trend of disappointing legal defeats" in terror-financing
cases.12
Despite this initial setback, however, the defendants were
ultimately convicted on retrial. The government retried the case and
won convictions for each defendant in 2008.'7 The second
prosecution was successful in part because prosecutors did a better
job of focusing in on the nuances of the zakat committees to show the
jury how HLF's donations freed up other assets for Hamas to use for
166. See, e.g., MCGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 390 (citing Greg Krikorian, Weak Case
Seen in Failed Trial of Charity, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2007), available at http://articles.
latimes.com/2007/nov/04/nation/na-holyland4/4 ("one juror told a reporter, 'I kept
expecting the government to come up with something, and they never did. From what I
saw, this was about Muslims raising money to support Muslims, and I don't see anything
wrong with that."')).
167. Id. at 388.
168. Id. at 390 (citing Greg Krikorian, Weak Case Seen in Failed Trial of Charity, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007).
169. MCGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 388-89.
170. Id.
171. Eaton, supra note 161.
172. Id.
173. Gretel C. Kovach, Five Convicted in Terrorism Financing Trial, N.Y. TIMES Nov.
25, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/us/25charity.html?scp=
1&sq=Five%20Convicted%20in%20Terrorism %20Trial&st=cse.
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terrorist attacks.7 4  According to a leading Muslim-American
advocate, Muslim Americans were shocked by the verdict and further
confused with regard to what charitable giving was allowed."' In May
2009, the defendants were sentenced to a combined 180 years in
prison."' The defendants are currently appealing.17
2. The Limitations of Prosecutions Under the Material Support Law
The HLF prosecution shows that while this legal tactic is
effective at punishing terrorist financers, it is also poses problems
with respect to the government's broader need to work with Muslim
Americans in the war on terror. Unlike the civil action, the criminal
prosecution of HLF was successful and this mechanism must remain
part of the government's arsenal. However, to best balance the
specific terrorist finance goals with the broader war on terror goals,
several considerations should govern the use of this mechanism in the
future.
The government should take seriously current concerns over the
material support law. A common suggestion for reform calls for
Congress to heighten the intent requirement for prosecutions of
material support or create an affirmative defense for humanitarian
assistance.17 ' Regardless of any changes to the law, the government
should be mindful of the potent effects prosecutions of Muslim
charities can produce. It should recognize this tactic as a crucial one
that is nonetheless best used when the government interest clearly
outweighs the negative consequences that the HLF case shows are
likely to result from such prosecutions.
174. MCGEOUGH, supra note 112, at 384.
175. Laurie Goodstein, U.S. Muslims Taken Aback by a Charity's Conviction, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/us/26charity.html?
scp=1&sq=U.S.%20Muslims%2OTaken%2OAback%20by%20a%20Charity%9 2s% 2OCon
viction,%20&st=cse.
176. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in
Holy Land Foundation Case Holy Land Foundation and Leaders Convicted on Providing
Material Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization (May 27, 2009).
177. Miriam Rozen, Appeals Follow Sentencing of Defendants in Holy Land
Foundation Case, TX. LAWYER (May 28, 2009), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/
PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202431047371&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=l.
178. See, e.g., AHILAN T. ARULANANTHAM, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR LAW AND
POLICY, A HUNGRY CHILD KNOWS NO POLITICS:' A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF THE
LAWS GOVERNING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND 'MATERIAL SUPPORT' OF TERRORISM
10 (June 2008), available at http://www.acslaw.org/Advance%20Spring% 20 09/A%
20Hungry%2OChild%20Knows%2ONo%20Politics.pdf.
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IV. Recommendations for Reform
A. Limit the Use of the Statute for Civil Litigation
Despite the controversial and largely unsettled nature of the
material support statute, private individuals have taken advantage of
the statutes to bring their own civil actions. As the Boim case shows,
this approach is controversial at best and problematic at worst. To
prevent the further unsettling of this area of the law, Congress should
prohibit the use of the material support criminal statutes by individual
parties in civil actions.
Although the same constitutional controversies plagued this civil
case, individual citizens were nonetheless able to creatively apply the
criminal statute as a basis for an equally controversial civil verdict.
Were the constitutional controversies regarding the material support
statutes fully resolved, perhaps such civil actions could potentially
play a beneficial role in the response to terrorism. But until those
controversies are fully resolved, such civil actions only engender
further controversy regarding the reach and application of the
statutes. Moreover, as discussed, the material support statute
originated in the national security context and is designed to be used
by federal prosecutors in the legal fight against terrorism. At the very
least, Congress should provide clearer guidelines as to how, if at all,
the material support statute may give rise to a civil cause of action.
Ideally, however, Congress should limit all such civil actions, at least
until the controversies surrounding the underlying material support
statute have been decisively settled.
B. Add a Specific Intent Requirement
Adding a specific intent requirement is the most apparent way to
clarify the law's scope and address constitutional concerns. The
Ninth Circuit held that no such requirement was necessary in light of
IRTPA's knowledge requirement amendment, but such an
amendment would nonetheless clarify the law and its application for
both legal and practical reasons.
Legal controversy persists despite IRTPA's knowledge
requirement amendment. For example, one critic raises the question
of what exactly the knowledge requirement applies to, and points out
that "[i]f 'knowingly' only modifies 'provides,' the mental state will be
satisfied by any donation that is not accidental or inadvertent of
material support to a group that is a designated foreign terrorist
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY1146 (Vol. 38:4
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organizations." 179 Under such a reading of the amended knowledge
requirement, "[t]he donor would not have to know that the aid is
material support and, more important, would not have to know that
contribution is going to a designated foreign terrorist organization."'"
Likewise, from the national security perspective, the amended
law remains nonetheless favorable precisely because it "[h]as a very
permissive mens rea standard. The government has no obligation to
show that the defendant knew or intended that the support would be
used for any particular purpose, let alone facilitate a crime."''
Instead, the government need merely show that "the defendant knew
the identity of the true recipient of the support and that the defendant
either knew that the group had been designated as a terrorist
organization, or, more likely, that the group engaged in terrorism."18 2
According to this view, the statute remains "particularly useful"1 3
because "[e]ven where prosecutors cannot prove membership [by
associational status] ... the broad range of conduct otherwise
associated with such groups-again without reference to whether the
government can link the individual to any particular violent plot."8"
Such an argument, however, proposes only a temporary solution
for several reasons. First, it leaves the material support law
susceptible to continued challenges on constitutional grounds.
Second, it calls for exploiting the statute's weakness, thereby
continuing the controversial approach of creative applications of the
statute. Indeed, its proponent also proposes adding a "certification
provision" in order to "reduce if not eliminate the risk that [section]
2339A would be deployed in circumstances unrelated to terrorism,
thus cabining the impact of the broad, prevention-oriented approach
to [section] 2339A... .. "' That the weak mens rea requirement
requires a corralling provision to prevent it from affecting other areas
of criminal law shows that the amended requirement still does not
end the controversy. Furthermore, it begs the question why such a
controversial application is acceptable with respect to the material
179. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Mens Rea for the Crime of Providing Material
Resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 861, 873 (2004).
180. Id.
181. Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive
Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 680-81 (2009).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 681.
184. Id. at 681.
185. Id. at 712.
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support law but not with respect to other laws. Adding a specific
intent requirement would finish the work begun by the knowledge
requirement amendment and would help resolve the controversial
uses of the material support law that nonetheless remains attractive to
some.
Such a change would also have helpful practical implications for
prosecuting terrorism. Lest it seem that this argument would
obliterate the strength of the material support statute or that any
change would be merely theoretical, the prosecution of HLF shows
the practical limitations of the knowledge requirement.
Conclusion
The legal challenge to the material support statute has taken
over a decade to litigate and has changed course several times in
response to repeated amendments to the law. The need for such
amendments results not only from legal challenges to the law, but also
from the law's key role in the legal response to terrorism. This
response has evolved significantly over the past three decades, and
will no doubt continue to evolve along with the challenge terrorism
presents. Given the evolving nature of the law and its practical
application, the final decision on the law's constitutionality did not
fully resolve the practical challenges facing the prosecutor or the
donors. The prosecutor and the donor remain in the same position-
unsure how best to proceed under the law given the controversies and
debates that have long surrounded it.
The reforms that this Note proposes would assist both the
prosecutor and the donor because they are based not only on the
constitutional debate surrounding the material support law, but also
on its practical implications. Further legislation to limit the use of the
material support statute in civil actions would ensure that the already
challenging terrain that the prosecutor and donor must navigate
would not be further complicated by the controversial actions of
individual citizens. A specific intent requirement would better
instruct the would-be donor and would also assist the prosecutor in
deciding which cases to prosecute and how best to win convictions.
The need to prosecute terrorism and the desire to make legal
donations are not mutually exclusive. Much of the controversy
surrounding the constitutionality of the material support law stems
from the fact that it often places the interests of the prosecutor and
the donor at odds. In addition to resolving the debate over the law's
constitutionality, proper reform of the law and its application will
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ensure that the prosecutor and the donor can proceed under the law
in a manner that allows them both to better achieve their
complementary goals.
In the aftermath of HLF's experience and the issuance of
recommended guidelines, Muslim Americans have responded with
helpful initiatives of their own. For example, a recently formed San
Francisco organization called Muslim Advocates has partnered with
the Better Business Bureau to create a voluntary accreditation
program for Muslim charities.'" The organization's lawyers scrutinize
Muslim charities and counsel them on how best to comply with the
government's standards and regulations.'" The group's leader has
also issued a list of recommendations to the government and recently
met with President Obama at the White House Ramadan
celebration." Such efforts offer a helpful route to achieve the related
goals of stemming terrorist financing and allowing Muslim Americans
to fulfill their zakat obligations.
As this Note has shown, the current approach to terrorist
financing has alienated Muslim Americans, made it difficult for them
to fulfill their zakat obligations, and therefore made it unlikely that
they would cooperate with the government. Such a result has made it
more difficult for the government to achieve its goal with respect to
both terrorist financing specifically and the war on terror more
broadly because it alienated Muslim Americans who could potentially
provide crucial knowledge toward these goals.
As President Obama recognized in his Cairo speech, the issue of
zakat plays a crucial role in the war on terrorism. Terrorist financing
is a particularly challenging facet of this war because of the complex,
often dual-natured Muslim charities that exist to collect and distribute
zakat. A successful legal approach to terrorist financing must
proceed from an understanding of this complexity. It must therefore
be based on a strategy that at once allows Muslim Americans to fulfill
their zakat obligations and allows the government to fight terrorist
financing and the broader war on terror as effectively as possible.
186. Moni Basu, Accreditation Aims to Ease Fear in Muslim Charitable Giving, CNN
(Sept. 19, 2009), available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/09/19/muslim.charities/index.
html?iref=allsearch. See also http://www.muslimadvocates.org.
187. Basu, supra note 187.
188. Farhana Khera, Breaking Down Barriers to Charity, ON FAITH (June 17, 2009,
11:29 AM), http://onfaith.washingtonpost.com/onfaithleboo-patel/2009/06/what-president
obamasscairo-sp.htmL See also Press Release, White House Office of Press Sec'y,
Expected Attendees (Sept. 1, 2009).
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Such a strategy must begin with further reform of the material
support statute.
